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MUNICIPAL TORT LIABILITY 
IN TENNESSEE 
A city is liable for negligent acts of its servants and 
agents when they are acting in a corporate proprietary or pri­
vate capacity, and not liable when they are acting in a govern­
mental or public capacity. This is the rule as generally stated 
and the rule that prevails in a majority of the states. There 
are two exceptions to· the rule that a city is not liable when 
acting in a governmental capacity (1) when a nuisance is being 
GOmmitted and (2) when the city has insurance to .cover the func­
tion to the extent of such coverage. 
These rules concerning municipal liability for corporate 
or private duties and non-liability for governmental duties ire 
elementary. The difficulty comes from the application. There 
are some duties that are clearly private, and others that are 
clearly governmental. It is the twilight zone that causes the 
confusion. 
In each case the question whether the town acted in a 
governmenta1 or proprietary capacity must be decided upon its 
own facts, and the purpose and character of the undertaking 
determine. whether it is ·,:-.µblic or private .1 
There is no sound basis on which to hold the city not liable 
where it is acting in a governmental capacity. No doubt this 
is largely responsible for the great confusion existing in the 
''twilight zone. " This immunity dates back to an English case2 
wherein there is supposed to be authority for the proposition 
that a governmental unit is immune from suit. This is a mis­
understanding of the case. The basis of decision in this in­
stance was that there was no fund from which a judgment cbuld be 
paid. An early Tennessee case3 stated: "'l'he reason is that the 
hazard of pecuniary loss might prevent the corporation from 
assuming duties which, although not strictly corporate, not 
essential to the corporate existence largely subserves the pub­
lic interest. " 
-T Williams v. Town of Morristown, 32 Tenn. app 274 ( 1949) 
2 Russell v. Men of Devon County, 2 T. R. 667 (1788) 




In preparing this bulletin an examination has been 
made of all the published opinions of Tennessee. No attempt 
has been made to cite all opinions because there is consider-
able duplication, especially in the decisions dealing with 
street and sidewalk accidents. An attempt, however, has been 
made to cover all tort liability problems that have been 




MUNICIPAL TORT LIABILITY 
IN TENNESSEE 
A city is liable for negligent acts of its servants and 
agents when they are acting in a corporate proprietary or pri­
vate capacity, and not liable when they are acting in a govern­
mental or public capacity. This is the rule as generally stated 
and the rule that prevails in a majority of the states. There 
are two exceptions to· the rule that a city is not liable when 
acting in a governmental capacity (1) when a nuisance is being 
GOmmitted and (2) when the city has insurance to .cover the func­
tion to the extent of such coverage. 
These rules concerning municipal liability for corporate 
or private duties and non-liability for governmental duties ire 
elementary. The difficulty comes from the application. There 
are some duties that are clearly private, and others that are 
clearly governmental. It is the twilight zone that causes the 
confusion. 
In each case the question whether the town acted in a 
governmenta1 or proprietary capacity must be decided upon its 
own facts, and the purpose and character of the undertaking 
determine. whether it is ·,:-.µblic or private .1 
There is no sound basis on which to hold the city not liable 
where it is acting in a governmental capacity. No doubt this 
is largely responsible for the great confusion existing in the 
''twilight zone. " This immunity dates back to an English case2 
wherein there is supposed to be authority for the proposition 
that a governmental unit is immune from suit. This is a mis­
understanding of the case. The basis of decision in this in­
stance was that there was no fund from which a judgment cbuld be 
paid. An early Tennessee case3 stated: "'l'he reason is that the 
hazard of pecuniary loss might prevent the corporation from 
assuming duties which, although not strictly corporate, not 
essential to the corporate existence largely subserves the pub­
lic interest. " 
-T Williams v. Town of Morristown, 32 Tenn. app 274 ( 1949) 
2 Russell v. Men of Devon County, 2 T. R. 667 (1788) 




In preparing this bulletin an examination has been 
made of all the published opinions of Tennessee. No attempt 
has been made to cite all opinions because there is consider-
able duplication, especially in the decisions dealing with 
street and sidewalk accidents. An attempt, however, has been 
made to cover all tort liability problems that have been 
presented to the appellate courts of Tennessee, 
CG 
-3-
"In respect to their streets and sidewalks, cities like 
counties, exercise a prerogative of sovereignty dele­
gated by the State, and it was not originally considered 
that they were liable for injury resulting from the 
negligent condition.of streets and sidewalks. Now the 
county as an arm or agency of the State is not liable 
for the negligent maintenance of highways ... Now in 
all of the States, with the possible· exception of 
South Carolina, municipal corporations are liable for 
injuries that result from the negligent maintenance of 
streets, sidewalks, and alleys·. Their liability rests 
upon either an express statute or upon implied authority." 
(It is submitted that the foregoing should be the correct view.) 
Without statutory authority cities and counties should be on the 
same footing. This, however, is not
.
the �ituation. In the case 
of Wood_ v. Tipton Countyll the court said: 
"Within their prescribed spheres the counties legislate 
for the public good, in respect to ordering the laying 
out of roads, building bridges, and such other local 
improvements as are for the public benef::\.. t, and author'� 
ized by law. They are no more liable to be sued for 
neglect of the duty of its officers than is th� State 
for similar neglect of duty by its officers. The com­
mon law gives no such a6tion, and it is therefore not 
sustainable at all unless given by the statute." 
The courts, however, were not consistent. In the case of 
Mayor of Memphis v. Lasserl2 the city was being sued for in­
juries sustained by a fall into a cistern in the street. In 
finding liability the Court reasoned that: "All the powers 
conferred upon a corporation for the local government of a town 
or city are, in judgment of law, for the private benefit of 
such corporation, although the public at large may also bene­
fit therefrom." This same reasoning would have applies! to 
counties. In the Lasser case it was not necessary.i� apply 
the reasoning referred to because the court found that a nuisance 
was being maintained. 
All decisions prior to _ City of Knoxville v. Felding_l3 finding 
liability against municipalities for negligent construction and 
maintenance of streets and sidewalks could have been justified on 
the nuisance theory. A nuisance 
11 i 1 · · ·  n egal parlance, extends to everything that 
endangers life or health, gives offense to the senses, 
�-1�66 Tenn. 112 See also �� 28 Tenn. 556 (1849) 
153 Tenn. 586 (1925) 




That this is a false premis.e is illustrated by the fact that 
municipalities have continued to cons�ruct and maintain streets 
despite the fact that the courts have declared this to be a pri­
vate function. 
Is there any test by which an harassed, frustrated city 
official can determine whether a proposed function is going to 
�e proprietary or g_overnmentftl? The case o .f Nashvi��rans_1-_� Company·v. Ci�y of _Nashvil]-_�� approves 38 Am. Jur .. 271 which 
collects �ases indicating the test to be whether the city has 
undertaken work of a comm�rcial character from which it sought 
to derive profit. A casual examination of the authorities, 
however, will explode such' theory. No one would say tLat the 
construction of city streets is "work of a commercial character" 
yet from the earliest cases5 it has been the corporate re­
sponsibility or the city to keep its streets in repair. Such 
theory is .not consistent with the theory that operation of an 
electric plant £or the sole purpose of li�hting streets and 
municipal bui1dings is .a. pri'A'.te function. Such a ruling, how­
ever, could be based on the proposition that the function was 
in competition with private industry. It is not necessary 
that a profit actual·y be r.ealiz.ed in order for the function 
to be propriet.a.ry. 7. On the othe.r hand, an incidental charge 
resu1ting in .a profit to the .. �unic.ipali.t.y does not render the service private or corporate. Despite the fact that an ex­
amination of tt� cases fails to d.isclose any hard and fast 
rules that may be applied in .arriving at a conclusion as to 
what is proprietary and what is governm�ntal, it is well to 
examine the cases for the conclusion reached in each. 
�-the construction an2_ maintenance of streets truly a 
proprietary function? 
· 
_There can be no question that such is the law in Tennessee 
at the present time. The manner of arriving at such results, 
however, is one of the most ambiguous and confusing chapters 
in the annals of common law. That the confusion still exists 
is manifest in the case of City of Knoxville v. Hargis9 when 
the court said: "Of course the Common I.aw d·uty of the city 
with respect to the maintenance of its streets and sidewalks 
is limited to them ... " It would appear that the court-here 
has the opinion that the duty to construct and maintain streets 
is a common law duty. 'I1his ls contrary to the court 1 s opinion 
in the case of City of Knoxville v. Felding_,10 wherein the court 
said: 
4 182 Tenn. 545 (1944) 
5 State v. Bar.!csdale, 24 Tenn. 15lJ. ( 1844), Mayor of Memphis v. 
J.as5er, 28 Tenn. 556 (1849), �� v. Ma:u_?r, 30 Ten:o-.. ?.r{ (18SO) 
, Saulman. v. _Qit.Y.: o:f Nashville, 131 Tenn. 4·2'( � Williams v. Town of Morristown, 32 Tenn. App. 274 (1949) 
9 
Na�!lvil le Trust Co_. v. City of Nashville, 182 Tenn. 51+5 ( 1944) 
184 Tenn. 262 (1946) 
- . 
10 153 Tenn. 586 (1925) 
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of those of the common . law are n�g to be exte�ded beyond the cases prescribed by the statute. It, therefore, follows that 
the Courts in order to be consistent would have found no lia­
bility in the Felding Case. 
This inconsistenc! continues in ?ther cases. In Shepherd 
v. City of Chattanooga 7 the court said: 
"So in Conelly v. Nashville, 100 Tenn. ?62, 46 S. W. 565, 
the act of spr.inkling a street was held to be a govern­
mental task bY- .refer.ring it to· the charter power ·to preserve 
the general health of the community rather than to the . 
" power to open, alter and repair streets. 
Under the reasoning in the Lasser Case18 there would not 
be this distinction. This .confusion continues with the examina­
tion of other cases. A.city was held .liable �or injury caused 
by a dead horse in the street,19 the theory of liability being 
that cities hold their streets in a proprietary capacity. The 
decision, however,.could easily have gone .the other way
28
n the 
basis that cle.aning streets is a governmental function, or 
that the ��gulatlon of the use of streets is a governmental function. In this . case, the court said: 
"The marn1er ·in_ which the streets should be used, however, 
calls for the exercise of municipal discretion, a govern­
mental power, and a municipality cannot be called to ac­
count respecting its employment of such a power. " 
Would a policeman .directing the removal of an obstruction 
from a street be acting in the capacity of policeman or super­
intendent of streets? In the case of Jackso_!!_V. Cit1[ of· Paris21a 
the policeman discovered a long wire attached to a truck. He 
stopped the truck and. removed . the wire, placing it in the gutter. 
He called the street superintendent and found that he was out 
of town. The policeman then called two city employees and directed 
them to remove the wire. In th� process one of these employees 
received serious injuries. The court found no liability on the 
ground that the policeman was acting in a governmental capacity 
in ordering the wire removed from the street. Logically this 
case is· in conflict with the Shepherd Case22 because it could be 
argued that the policeman was�erely acting as an official of 
the city in employing a person to remove an obstruction from 
the street. In the Shepherd Case the Court said: 
16 M'Crea v. Galey_, 1 Tenn. 251; Hearn v. Pendelton, 43 'renn. 399 
17 168 Tenn. 153 (1934) 
18 Memphis v. Lasser, 28 Tenn. 756 
19 Nashville v. Feriilizer Co. , 127 Tenn. 107 (1912) 
20 Hale v. City of Knoxville, 189 Tenn. 491 ( 1949) 
21 Town of Gainesboro v. Gore, 131 Tenn. 35 (191��) 21a33 Tenn. App. 55(1949)-
22 Shepherd v. Q1ty of C�attanooga, 168 Tenn. 153 
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violates the laws of decency, or obstructs the reason­
able and comfortable use of propertyA Anything which 
renders a public highway unsafe rrir travelers thereon 
is a nuisance. (citing cases). 11 + 
The Feiding Case, however, presented a new situat�o�. An em­
ployee '·1erf- the· city engaged in the construct.ion of a street was 
·injured by a pie�� o.f steel flying from a hammer bein� wielded 
by a fellow employee. In order to uphold a recovery in this 
case the Court deemed it necessary to find statutory authority 
for the proposition that .construction of streets by a munici­
pality is a proprdetary function. T�e ����t said: 
11The rigid application of statutes that require 
notice as a condition precedent to suit against 
the city, and the precision exacted as to time, 
place and nature of the injury, cannot be justi­
fied except upon the ground that originally the 
law forbade a recovery ... " 
The statute referred to is Chapter 55, Public Acts 1913 which 
reads as follows: 
" No suit shall be brought against any municipal 
corporation, on account of injuries received by 
person or property on account of the negligent con­
dition of any street, alley, sidewalk, or highway of 
such municipality unless within ninety days after such· 
injury to the person or property has been inflicted� 
a written notice shall be served upon the mayor or 
manager of said municipality, stating the time and 
place where said injury was received and the general 
nature of injury inflicted. The failure to give the 
notice prescribed in this section, within the time 
set out, shall be fi valid defense against any liability 
of the municipa·;1.:ll"�U which might otherwise exist on 
account of t;he de'fe·cti ve or negligent condition of 
said streeJq, ,:f11ley, sidewalk, or highway; and provid.ed, 
further, that proof of registered letter by registry 
receipt addressed to the mayor or manager setting Torth 
the injury and place of injury complained 6f shall .be a complete compliance with this secti'on. 11 
Prior to the 1913 statute no action for negligence in the 
construction and maintenance of streets had been brought against 
a municipality that could not be prosecuted under the nuisance 
doctrine. Statutes in derogation of common law are strictly 
construed,15 and modes of proceeding under statute in derogation 
14 Yarbrough v. L & N RR Co., 11 Tenn. App. 456 
15 Baker v. Dew, 133 Tenn. l26, and cases cited therein. 
-· 
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" it seems to us to follow logically and necessarily 
that in the selection and use of the physical means and 
agencies by which this obligation is to be performed 
the municipality is likewise acting in its corporate 
capacity. " 
This case in turn is in direct conflict with another case. 23 That 
case involved a waterworks, which function had previously been 
held to be a proprietary .runction.24 Nevertheless, the Court in 
the Smtldy Case said: 
"The operati�n of a water plant being a governmental function 
upon all of the authorities, we think it equally clear that 
the decision to employ persons to operate it, as well as the 
fixing of their salaries, is also a governmental duty." 
One could assume that this quotation was a mistake and the court 
intended the words "water plant " to read "fire department " because 
the case ·involved employees o'r a fire department. In a subsequent 
case,25 however, the statemen� was referred to with approval. 
A city is liable for patent defects in sidewalks and streets 
that result in injury26 unless the defect is the result of a plan
8 adopted by the city27 which is not dangerous as a matter of law.2 
Ordinarily the city is not liable for a dangerous conditton of the 
streets or sidewalks resulting from natural causes such as snow 
and ice even though the cit� in attempting to clear away snow con­
tributes to the condition.29 There may be liability, however, if 
the snow and ice is allowed to accumulate to the extent
38
f creating 
a nuisance and there is an affirmative duty to inspect. The court 
in this case said: 
"The duty of the municipality to use ordinary care in 
keeping its streets in a safe condition for public tra­
vel involves the inspection of defects that are the 
natural and ordinary result of climatic influence. " 
23 ·.§midd_l v. City of Memphis 140 Tenn. 97 
24 Saulman v. Nashv11le, 131 Tenn. 427 
25 Yarbrough v. L&N RR C_?...:..�· 11 Tenn. App. 456 
26 Jackson v. Pool, 91 Tenn. 448, 93 Tenn. 62 
27 Clrty of NashVUle v. Brown., 25 Tenn. App. 34 28 Swain v. City of Nashville, 170 Tenn. 99 
29 Hale v. City of Knoxville, 189 Tenn. 491 
30 Cit_x of Nashville v. Nevin, 12 Tenn. App. 336 
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This does not mean that a city warrants its sidewalks to be safe, 
but is liable for any damage caused by defective wal.ks, which it 
knew or might have l<:n.own by exercise of reasonable care, to be 
defective. 31 The condition c�eating the defect may have been 
created by the abuttjng property owner. Nevertheless the city is 
jointly liable where it has actual or constructive notice of the 
dangerous condition and does nothing'to abate it. 32 The city has 
the duty to inspect and actual notice is.�ot necessary.33 
The obligation to keep sidewalks and streets in repair is a 
primary one. By statute34 property ow�e�� may be made jointly 
liable by cities authorized so to do, or by notice to the property 
owner at least five days before the accident the liability may 
be passed to the property owners.35 An ordinance, however, requir­
ing abutting property owners to keep.walks in repair does not im­
pose liability on owner:lbr injuries.36 The primary liability of 
the city is not shifted by statute or ordinance.37 In other words 
an injured party may elect whether to sue the city or the property 
owner. 
We have been discussing liability for injury to persons caused 
by d�fective construction and maintenance of walks and streets. 
Municipalities are also liable for injuries to property. A city 
cannot lawfully cut ditches and canals so as to empty the water 
from ponds in such a manner as to flood private property without 
being liable.38 By statute39 a city is liable for damages caused 
by a change in the grade of a street.40 The change in
4�
rade need 
not be on the same side of the street as the property. This 
liability holds even though the grading is done by a third person 
without the regular or formal consent of the city.42 
By statute43 a person bringing suit for injuries received on 
account of negligent condition of any street, alley, sidewalk or 
highway must give written notice to the mayor or manager stating 
place of injury and desoriping extent of injury. The location of 
31 Brown v. C1-t¥ of Chattanoo�? .  180 Tenn. 284 (1943) 
32 Osbor.n ·e-fal v. City of Nashville, 182 Tenn. 197 ( 1944) 
33 City of Clarksville v. Deason, 9 Tenn. App. 274 (1928) 
34 Williams Tennessee Code-:-annotated Section 3402 
35 Id. Section 3403 
36 Vinson v. Fentress, 3 Tenn. App. 359 (1950) 
37 Harbin v. Smith, 168 Tenn. 112, City of Knoxville v. Fer�  
241 �.w. 2d 612 (1951) 
3 Burton v. Chattanooga, 75 Tenn. 739, Dixon et al v. City_gf 
Nashville, 29 Tenn. App. 282 (1946) 
39williams, Code annotated, Section 3401� 40 _9hattanooga v. Geiler, 81 Tenn. 611, Graz. v. Knoxville., 85 Tenn. c:!9 
41 City of Knoxvill� v. Phillips� 162 Tenn. 328
, 
(1930) 42 �ity of Knox��lle v. Bunt, 156 Tenn. 7 (1927J 
43 Williams Code�-:-annotated, Sec. 8596 
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f creating 
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24 Saulman v. Nashv11le, 131 Tenn. 427 
25 Yarbrough v. L&N RR C_?...:..�· 11 Tenn. App. 456 
26 Jackson v. Pool, 91 Tenn. 448, 93 Tenn. 62 
27 Clrty of NashVUle v. Brown., 25 Tenn. App. 34 28 Swain v. City of Nashville, 170 Tenn. 99 
29 Hale v. City of Knoxville, 189 Tenn. 491 
30 Cit_x of Nashville v. Nevin, 12 Tenn. App. 336 
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opeJ;"at,ing a swimming pool. This pcol is patronized by many people 
not residents of the city and actually operates at a small profit .• 
or, at least,  does not require the expenditure of any public funds. 
Yet this operation was held to be a governmental function and the 
city would not be liable for the negligent oper�tion thereof. A 
nuisance, however" may be created in connection with the operation 
thereof. A nuisance :1 however.• may be created in connection with 
the operation of a swimming pool by permitting the drainage from 
the pool and the showers to gather in pools that .'serve as a breed-· 
ing place for mosquitoes and which give o.ff ol'f'ensive odors. The 
city becomes liable for such nuisance. 
By statute56 the operation of airports is made a governmental 
function. The constitutionality of this act has been sustainea.57 
In this case it was found that a wire placed to protect a grass 
plot did not constitute a nuisanee.58 Enforcing punitive ordi­
nances is a governmental. function .. 59 
The operation of' the jail and the working of prisoners to pay 
oi.'f .fines is a govermnent?-1 function.60 The operati.on of a park is 
a governmental i'unction.9 61 however, the city is liable for a nuisance, 
created in connection therewith.62 
Building a sewer is a governmental .function. rrhe construction 
however is not to be done in. a negligent
. 
manQer.63 Leayig� dyna-mite cap lying around constitutes an attractive nuisance. It 
is a question .for the jury as to whethe.r a catch basin is a nuisance.65 
Dischag�e of ·sewerage near p:civate property may constitute a nui­sance. � sewer overflowing onto private prope5ty constitutes a nuisance· and renders the city liable to damages. 7 Closely allied 
with sewage disposal is the collection of garbage, which is also a 
governmental function, an� a city is not liable for negligence un-
less a nuisance is created.68 An affirmative act of the city is 
required to create a nuisance.69 
---··50-Chapter 116, Public Acts 1933 
5
5� e.�oC�E;_!:_ V. Q_!.�l..-�f Nasl!Y.�-���-·" 1'{1� Tenn. 483 
59 ;?
t.Q.Cke?:_ V • Qit;y_£_:[_!:!£�t1v1:lle,, 174 r.rerm. 1+83 
Hale v. 
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the place must be definite.44 Such notice, however, is not re­
quired if the city committed the act which caused the injury,45 
or if a contractor failed to g�ard or give warriing of an excava­
tion. 46 The notice must b� explicit,4'( and must be served on the 
proper official,48 and must be giveri prior to instituting suit.49 
Other Activities Which Have 
Been Considered Propri.etar:;y or Private in Nature 
There are many othe� activities of �unicipalities which are 
considered proprietary and for which cities have been held liable 
for g0gligence in the performance of such functions. In an early case a steamboat coming into a city operated wharf hit a cylin­
der which had been on the . dock for several months, but which was 
submerged at the ti'me. The operation of the wharf was held to be 
a proprietary function. 
The operation of a water works system for "profit" means the 
system is being conducted on a commercial basis for revenue and not 
as a governmental enterprise even though no profit is realized in 
the operation thereor.51 The operation o� a market house is a 
proprietary function agg the city is liable for injury caused by 
a defect in the floor.� The operation of a power plant is a 
private function.53 Licensing ordinarily would be a public opera­
tion. The city, however, was held accountable for licensing a 
lunatic as a druggist.54 
Ci t;y fun·ctions_ which_ have . been. considered .. governmental in 
nature !_ .. .§ind. for _which .city is . not. liable even though n�g-· 
In the case of .VaughaQ v. City of Alcoa55 the city was engaged in 
44 . City of Knoxville _Y. .. '.. BYanL_.13 �enn. App. 186, Gidcome et al. 
v. � of Nashville, 177 Tenn. 295 ( 1940) 
1+5 Sneed v.. City of Memphis,! _6 Tenn. App" ( 1927) Hood v. Allen 190 Tenn. 56 (1950) :� Hughes v. City of Nashville� �37 Tenn. 177 (1916) 
4
r City of Knoxville_'v,. RyanJ. _ _  18 Tenn. App. 186 
4
8 Avant v. City of Memphis, 18 Tenn. App. 362 
9 Gelky v. CitL_of Memphis, 159 Tenn. 220 
�O Memphis v-�imbro�h, 59- Tenn. 133 
�l Williams v.-T'O-wrlof-Morristown, 32 Tenn. App. 274 (1949) 
�2 City of Nashville .v. Fox, 6 Tinn. App. 653 
' 
53 City of Lawrenceburg V:-_Q�, 11 Tenn. App. 493 (1929) Null v. 
Electric ..  Power Bqard of the City of Nashville, 30 Tenn. App. 696 '(1948) 
--:;4 Cole v. Nashville, 36 Tenn. 162 
55 June 7' 1952 J not ye0t reported 
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Governmental immunity extends to tpe operation of a hospital 
and generally speaking a cit� i� not liable for the negligence of 
officers and employees of such institutions. � O 
The operation of a cemetery is a governmental function.Bl 
In order to answer this question several things must be taken 
into consideration. 
( 1) ··-·Would _ _  the .. �&. officials _be_�uthorized to __ spend money for 
this purpO"se? ____ We have .found no case directly in poigt in
· Tertnessee 
or any other state. There i�, however, in one state 2 dicta to the 
effect that such expenditure would not be legal. In that case the 
court made this observation: 
"It is tl).e settled law of this state that a mtlnicipal 
corporation is not liable for negligence in the per­
formance o.f a governmental .functi.on. Under any ordi-· 
nary circumstances, for it to compensate one injured 
by such negligence mignt ·welLi:'be- 1to use public funds and 
impose a burden upon its taxpayers for an unlawful, pur­
pose which it has no right to do. (citing cases) .. . It 
was stated in oral argument that the city was insured 
against liability of this nature, but, if so, that would 
almost of necessity mean the use of money of the city 
to pay premiums for such insurance, which would be open 
to ·the s ugges ti on we have stated . . .  '' 
The questi6n has not been raised in Tennessee. Consistent reason­
ing, however, would necessitate this concl�sion. In Nashville v. 
Sutherland Co. 83 the city attempted to contract for the construc­
tion of a sewer line. Subsequently water backed up and injured 
the company's property. The city was not liable for negligent 
construction of the g4wer line. This case, the case of Blapk v. City of . Co·lumbia, and the ca:.:ae of Van Horn v. Des Moines-
85 
are quoted with approval in the case of Nashville Trust Co. v. 
• 
80 Lane v. City of Knoxville, 170 Tenn. 482 (1936) 81 Town of Pulaski v. ·Ballentine, 153 Tenn. 393 ( 1925) �� Lambert v. City of New Haven, 129 Conn. 647 304, 2d. 923 
84 
92 Tenn. 335 
19 S.C. 412, 45 Am. Rep. 785 85 63· Iowa 447 
-10-,-
Adopting, installing, equipping and operating a fire depart­
ment is a governmental function;70 ·Eitinguishing fires i�? a 
public and not a corporate one and the city is not liable for 
negligence of the fire department in responding to . a ca11. 71 The 
installation and operation of a fire alarm system is a govern­
mental function.72 Supplying water to a sprinkler system is a 
governmental function, and in this regard the city acts in a 
dual capacity. 73 
· 
It is not a nuisance to operate a fire truck at a speed where 
it was the custom to throw �ignal lights and to sound a siren, and 
negligence in the
4
operation of the signal system does not render 
the city liable.7 
Police activities come within the category of governmental 
functions. 75 In commenting on this matter the court in the case 
of Davis v. Knoxville76 said: 
"However difficult it may be in some instances to deter-.. 
mine whether a particular act or duty falls within ihe 
general governmental or public powers of the corporation, 
or pertains to its purely local and special side, yet in 
the case under consideration there can be no doubt but that 
the acts complained of fall within the general or public 
functions of the city of Knoxville. The preservation of 
order, the maintenance of sobriety, the arrest and de­
tention of violators . . .  is not for the local and private 
benefit ·of the corporation. " 
This non liability for the wrongful acts of a policeman in �aking 
an arrest77 continues even though it is known to the officials of 
the city that a policeman is insane and dangerous.78 A city may 
beco·me liable for the personal tort of a policeman if the act 
was sanctioned by the city officials. 79 
' 
70 Smiddy v. Me!!!P-his, 140 Tenn. 97 ( 1918) , Irvi_!2� v. Ch?tto.nooga 
101 Tenn. 291 
71 Irvine v. Chattanooga, 101 Tenn. 291 (1898) i� Gorman v. Mayor and Aldermen, 2 Civ. App. 551 (1910) 
74 
NaBhville Trust Co. v. City _of Nashville, 182 Tenn. 545 (1944) 
75 
Burnett v. Rudd, 165 Tenn. 238 .(1932) 
Pesterfield v. Vickers, 43 Tenn. 205, Chavin v. Malor and Cit¥ 
Council, 1 Civ. App. 317 
76"90 Tenn. 599 
77 .Qombs v. Ci1l._Qf Elizabethtotl, 161 Ten:.1. 363 
O'Qugnn v. Baptist Memorial Hospital, 184 Tenn. 570 (1947) i
9 
Bobo v. Cit;y_of Kenton, 186 Tenn. 515 (1948) 
Johnson City v. Woife, 103 Tenn. 277 
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In the absence of charter authority it seems advisable 
for municipalities to refr�in f�6m spending money to purchase 
liability insurance to cover governmental activities. The un­
certainties surrounding this phase of municipal law point up 
the need for general legislation that will permit a city that 
so desires to spend money for this p�rpose and to limit lia­
bility to the amount of coverage, and legalize the contractuai 





City of . .:.Nashville�6 where the court said� 
11Under these authorities a city cannot assume iiability 
for negligence in cases where the law relieves it of 
liability. In other words, a city is without power to 
enter into a contract rendering it liable for the neg­
ligence of its servants in the exercise of a governmental 
function. " 
It logically follows that if a city has no authority to waive govern­
mental immunity87 it would have no authority to spend money for lia­
bility insurance covering governmental activities. 
There have been instances in Tennessee where such policies have 
been enforced against the insurance company. In the case of Rogers 
et al v. ButlerB8 it was held that a county generally cannot be 
held i'iable for negligence of its agents and employees. The court 
found� however, that the carrying of liability insurance to cover 
accidents to children riding the bus was authorized by statute. 
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ance was not raised and not discussed. An examination of the Kingsport 
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official·s become per·sonall;y: liable for the .. expenditure of fund.s 
therefor? 
In Tennessee there seem to be no cases in point. There is 
am�le authority in other states to holding officials liable for 
the illegal disb�rsement of funds.90 · 
Municipalities are specifically authorized by statute91 to 
carry workmen's compensation on its employees. 
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